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We examine the determinants of the food insufficiency rise during the COVID-19 crisis in 
2020. We then examine the degree to which unemployment insurance benefits mitigate the effect 
of job loss on food insufficiency and quantify the impact of a $600 reduction in maximum weekly 
unemployment insurance benefits. We utilize novel Household Pulse Survey data to estimate linear 
fixed-effect regressions and difference-in-differences models. We find that households reporting 
pandemic-induced job loss have a 4.3 percentage point increase in food insufficiency risk relative 
to those working, and the gap grows to 6.1 percentage points in the absence of unemployment 
insurance. While food insufficiency rates decrease by 2 percentage points for unemployment 
insurance beneficiaries under the $600 weekly expansion, this effect disappears after the expiration 
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1. Introduction 
While the COVID-19 pandemic has been declared a public health crisis for its direct impact 
on health, it also plays an insidious role in harming wellbeing by causing food insufficiency rates 
to skyrocket. Compared with a 36% increase after the Great Recession, food insufficiency tripled 
from 2019 rates during the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic (Ziliak 2020). Figure 1 illustrates the 
trends in food insufficiency alongside the COVID-19 hospitalization rate. While the rate of food 
insufficiency before the pandemic hovered around 3.5%, we observe rates between 9.7% and 
13.7% during our observation period in 2020. Food insufficiency has been associated with poor 
nutrition (Rose 1999; Rose and Oliveira 1997; Bhattacharya et al. 2003) and harms physical and 
mental health (Siefert et al. 2001). Despite $2.1 trillion in government COVID-19 supplemental 
funding to ease the shock of the pandemic, millions of US families do not have enough food to 
eat.2  
The COVID-19 pandemic also caused a sharp rise in unemployment to a maximum of 
14.8% in April 2020 (Bureau of Labor Statistics 2021). Job loss incurs a higher risk of food 
insufficiency, which is partially offset by government policy support (see Section 2 for further 
discussion). Employment rates also fell more for workers in low-wage jobs (Chetty et al. 2020), 
who may have fewer liquid assets that protect against food insufficiency (Gundersen and Gruber 
2001; Ribar and Hamrick 2003; Leete and Bania 2010). We investigate the impacts of the COVID-
19 pandemic, focusing on the mechanism of job loss. In this paper, we apply an economic lens to 
quantify food insufficiency in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic—who is most at risk, and 
how effective is unemployment insurance at protecting those who it was designed to insure?  
 
2 Spending as of February 28, 2021. Source: https://www.usaspending.gov/disaster/covid-19 
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Figure 1: Food Insufficiency and COVID-19 Hospitalizations per 100,000 
 
Notes: Shares are weighted using survey sample weights. Week 54 indicates the second week of 2021. The second 
round of stimulus checks was distributed to households between weeks 52 and 54.   
 
 The United States government responded to the COVID-19 crisis by supplementing the 
unemployment insurance (UI) program substantially, among other social safety net expansions 
(see Bitler et al. 2020 for a review). The Federal Pandemic Unemployment Compensation (FPUC) 
program extended the program duration by 13 weeks for recipients and expanded eligibility to 
include self-employed, gig workers, and those not earning enough to qualify for regular UI. The 
FPUC supplemented the maximum UI benefit amount by $600 per week until the Lost Wages 
Assistance (LWA) program supplanted it in August 2020. Although the LWA provides extended 
UI benefits retroactively for the six weeks beginning August 1, the payments were distributed at 
different times in each state (see Appendix Table A3). LWA claimants received no additional UI 
benefit until the first check arrived, typically as a lump sum of the previous weeks’ backlogged 
payments.  
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Despite the US government’s efforts to provide support during the crisis, we still observe 
exceedingly high food insufficiency levels in the population. Bitler et al. (2020) justify the 
disconnect between assistance and unmet need, finding that delays in program implementation and 
coverage gaps contribute to the inadequacy of policy response in alleviating food insufficiency. 
This paper’s first contribution provides an estimation of food insufficiency as a function of 
the COVID-19 crisis, emphasizing the role of pandemic-induced employment loss. We employ 
linear regression with state and week fixed effects for all estimations, favoring the linear model 
over the probit and logit models due to its ease of interpretation and freedom from the bias 
observed in the nonlinear models with fixed effects (Greene 2004). We primarily use household-
level data from the United States Census Bureau’s Household Pulse Survey for the analysis. We 
measure food insufficiency as a binary variable equal to 1 if the household sometimes or often did 
not have enough to eat, based on the USDA food sufficiency question. We also examine the 
determinants of food insufficiency defined broadly to include households that have enough but not 
the kinds of food wanted. Additionally, we consider the determinants of household spending on 
groceries and prepared meals.  
We document the direct effect of the pandemic on food insufficiency: each 1% increase in 
the state COVID-19 hospitalization rate is associated with .3 percentage point increase in food 
insufficiency. We find that households headed by someone not working due to pandemic reasons 
have a 4.5 percentage point higher food insufficiency risk than those with employed household 
heads, and 3 percentage points higher food insufficiency rate than those not working due to other 
reasons. We also find evidence of grocery hoarding behavior in response to higher COVID-19 
hospitalization rates and anticipated income loss.  
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For this paper’s second contribution, we evaluate the role of UI in mitigating the effect of 
pandemic-induced job loss on food insufficiency. We begin by interacting job status with four 
measures of UI generosity. Then, we specify a difference-in-differences model that quantifies the 
effect of a $600 weekly drop in maximum UI benefits on food insufficiency. We employ a 
difference-in-differences framework that compares the rise in food insufficiency for UI beneficiary 
households after the FPUC expiration on July 31, 2020 to households that do not receive UI. While 
similar to the framework of Berkowitz and Basu (2021), we differentiate our work by applying 
inverse-propensity weights to balance covariates between UI recipient and non-recipient 
households. We do so to address endogeneity concerns arising from potential unobservable 
differences between the groups. Additionally, we consider the non-smooth introduction of the 
LWA program by providing short-run estimates of the program expiration effect. For these 
estimations, we exclude observations made after the first LWA to ensure a uniform drop in 
maximum benefits across all states.  
We find that households with pandemic-induced job loss that don’t receive UI face a 6.1 
percentage point increase in food insufficiency risk. All of our UI measures were significant in 
reducing food insufficiency for households with pandemic-induced job loss, and the measures 
became significant in reducing food insufficiency for other non-working households when we 
broadened the food insufficiency definition. Our difference-in-differences model estimates the 
protection afforded by UI with the additional $600 weekly supplement to be 2 percentage points 
for all households and 3 percentage points for non-working households. However, this effect is 
offset by the expiration of the supplement. Indeed, we find that the effect of receiving UI after the 
supplement expires is positive and larger in magnitude than the negative effect of receiving 
expanded UI. We observe the rate of food insufficiency for recipient households grows as time 
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goes on, indicating that the base UI is not enough to combat the increasing pressure of the 
pandemic on food insufficiency.  
Our paper contributes to the nascent literature surrounding the COVID-19 crisis by 
applying inverse-propensity weights to make the UI recipient and nonrecipient groups similar in 
observed characteristics. We expect the balancing to also make the groups similar in unobservable 
characteristics, which may be correlated with error in our model, to address endogeneity concerns. 
Additionally, we know of no other papers that address the confounding effects of the LWA 
program in estimating the effect of UI on food insufficiency.  
The rest of the paper adheres to the following structure: Section 2 provides an overview of 
the relevant literature and the hypotheses it has informed. Section 3 describes the data sources and 
presents analyses of spending inequality. Section 4 offers the empirical models, while Section 5 
follows, containing the results. Section 6 concludes. 
2. Literature Review and Hypotheses 
In this section, we first review studies that establish the relationship between employment 
shocks and food insufficiency and spending, then we turn to the research that concerns policy 
impacts. Next, we survey literature to compare spending during the COVID-19 pandemic to past 
crises. Finally, we review other papers that use similar difference-in-differences estimations and/or 
the HPS dataset.  
Unemployment and Income Shocks 
Rose (1999) establishes that job loss is associated with increased risk of food insufficiency. 
Studies find significant associations between job loss and food insufficiency in Australia (Temple 
2018), Toronto (Loopstra 2013), and Europe during the 2008 recession (Loopstra 2016). Analysis 
of the Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP) estimated the odds of food insecurity 
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to be 78% higher for households experiencing job loss during the Great Recession (Birkenmaier 
2015). In comparison, a survey of Vermont households during the pandemic found that recent job 
loss led to 206% higher odds of food insecurity (Niles 2020). Leete and Bania (2010) also analyze 
SIPP data and offer further support that negative income shocks are associated with food 
insufficiency. Although Heflin et al. (2007) did not find recent job loss significant in predicting 
food insufficiency in the Michigan Women’s Employment Study, they find that hours worked are 
negatively associated with food insufficiency.  
Food insecurity rates decline with income, yet more factors play into the experience of 
hardship than income alone, as many food insecure households are not poor (Gundersen et al. 
2011). Analyses of the SIPP firmly establish that income volatility is associated with increased 
food insufficiency risk, while liquid assets are protective (Gundersen and Gruber 2001; Ribar and 
Hamrick 2003; Leete and Bania 2010).  
Income shocks also play a role in food spending. Baker and Yannelis (2017) find a 
temporary shift of compensation due to the 2013 government shutdown caused households to 
reallocate spending across time and types of consumption. Households with liquidity and credit 
restraints were more sensitive to the shock, and consumption recovered quickly at the end of the 
shutdown. Although some households experienced similar temporary employment loss during the 
pandemic due to furlough, the current crisis brings much more uncertainty of long-run job security. 
This crisis also differs from past employment shocks in that certain industries have been hit harder 
than others, particularly those that require physical contact, such as restaurant service or salons, 
and employment in low-wage jobs has declined the most (Chetty et al. 2020). We expect food 
insufficiency to rise more during the pandemic than previous economic downturns since low-wage 
workers who are less likely to have protective assets were hit the hardest.  
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Recent studies of pandemic spending find that people experiencing pandemic-related 
unemployment have a significantly larger spending drops than those that didn’t lose jobs 
(Andersen 2020) and that households expecting unemployment loss are less responsive to the 
CARES stimulus payment (Baker et al. 2020b). These observations support the consumption-
smoothing hypothesis. We expect to find similar evidence of consumption-smoothing behavior in 
response to experienced or expected job loss. We hypothesize that households experiencing a loss 
of income will have higher rates of food insufficiency over time, as assets and savings deplete.  
Policy  
 We consider previous studies that examine the impact of social protection policies on food 
insufficiency. In Europe during the 2008 recession, Loopstra et al. (2016) found that $1,000 
increases of per-capita government spending on social protection mitigated the association 
between job loss and food insufficiency by .05 percentage points, and job loss became insignificant 
after $10,000 of per-capita spending. Ionescu-Ittu et al. (2014) found that a $100 monthly benefit 
for Canadian households with young children reduced food insufficiency rates by 2.4 percentage 
points. Borjas (2004) found that a 10 percentage point drop in the fraction of the population 
receiving any kind of public assistance increased food insecurity by 5 percentage points. Bitler and 
Hoynes (2015) find that UI offers more (or no less) protection from poverty during the Great 
Recession. Berkowitz and Basu (2020) and Raifman (2020) also examined the impact of UI on 
food insufficiency, and we discuss their work in the methods subsection.  
In response to the pandemic, the US federal government allowed states to expand eligibility 
for Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP, formerly Food Stamp Program) benefits, 
which may be applied to food purchases at approved retail food outlets. A study examining the 
introduction of the Food Stamp Program found that food stamps reduce out-of-pocket food 
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spending and increase overall food expenditures (Hoynes and Schanzenbach 2009). However, the 
direct effect of SNAP on food insufficiency appears to be insignificant (Gundersen and Oliviera 
2001; Hashad 2020).  
Spending Response to Crisis  
We now turn to review the literature concerning consumer spending responses to COVID-
19 and past crises. First, we consider pressures hypothesized to decrease spending.  
In the wake of economic shocks, households adjust shopping behavior by switching to 
lower-cost retailers (Coibion 2015) or generic products, buying larger sizes or sale items, or using 
coupons (Nevo and Wong 2019). Griffith et al. (2015) find that UK households during the Great 
Recession raised shopping effort and adjusted shopping basket composition to lower real food 
expenditures without sacrificing the number of calories purchased. Spending more time to search 
for lower prices is more common among those unemployed (Kaplan and Menzio 2016) and poorer 
households (Arslan et al. 2020).  
By April 7, 2020, all but five US states had issued stay-at-home orders. Mobility 
restrictions caused individuals to spend more time home and less time in restaurants and grocery 
stores. In response to government lockdown orders and mobility restrictions, consumers reduce 
restaurant spending (Andersen et al. 2020) and overall food spending (Coibion et al. 2020).  
While job loss, adjusted spending behavior and lockdown orders constitute downward 
consumption pressures, we also consider multiple positive pressures on food spending. The US 
government responded to the crisis by providing large lump sum payments to taxpayers. Three 
studies apply OLS and 2SLS regression to the Consumer Expenditure Surveys to investigate the 
impacts of previous positive lump sum income shocks on household spending. In response to tax 
refunds, Souleles (1999) finds that spending on food increases significantly for households with 
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income in the bottom 25% or 15% of the sample. The same regression analyses on all incomes 
yield positive yet insignificant increases in food spending in response to the 2001 tax rebate 
(Johnson, Parker and Souleles 2006) and the economic stimulus payments distributed in 2008 
(Parker et al. 2013). Compared with the significantly smaller lump sum payments made in 2001 
and 2008, Baker et al. (2020b) find the consumption increases in food spending in response to the 
April 2020 stimulus payments to be larger, more immediate, and more significant. They find the 
response to be stronger for households with lower incomes and lower levels of liquidity, as well 
as for households with larger income drops.  
Disaster-induced spending on survival necessities, including nonperishable foods, increased 
after the 2003 SARS outbreak in China (Qiu et al. 2018), 2011 Christchurch earthquake (Forbes 
2017), and after the 2011 Tohoku earthquake in Japan (Hori and Iwamoto 2014). A study of 
Chinese citizens living in cities affected by the COVID-19 outbreak finds that those with less food 
at home, poor psychological status, and women report a greater need to hoard food during the 
beginning of the pandemic (Wang and Hao 2020). Studies of transaction data from the United 
States and Denmark during the COVID-19 pandemic observe grocery spending increases 
consistent with stockpiling behavior (Baker et al. 2020a; Andersen et al. 2020). Loxton et al. 
(2020) suggest that panic buying, herd mentality, and a shift of prioritization to buy goods that 
satisfy physiological needs explain the spike in consumer spending on groceries.  
The panic buying and food hoarding behavior exhibited by consumers increased demand at 
grocery retailers, which, coupled with supply chain disruptions (McKinsey 2020), contributed to 
the food price increases illustrated in Figure A3. Price increases necessitate higher spending to 
afford the same amount of food, which has adverse effects on welfare, especially among the lowest 
income households (Vu and Glewwe 2011; Ivanic and Martin 2008).  
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We hypothesize that the pressures of the COVID-19 pandemic will cause consumers to shift 
spending away from prepared meals, which may be considered a luxury good, towards groceries, 
which are essential. We expect to see evidence of food hoarding that will be strongest at the 
beginning of the crisis. Food price increases also put upward pressure on spending, although the 
greatest price increases documented in Figure A3 occurred before our sample window.  
Consumers have responded to the health aspect of this crisis by adopting online grocery 
shopping behaviors to avoid viral exposure occurring with in-person shopping. As observed during 
the 2003 SARS outbreak (Kee and Wan 2004), there has been a rise in online grocery shopping in 
2020, particularly among younger and higher-income households (RAND 2020; McKinsey 2020). 
The hesitancy of older individuals to embrace online grocery shopping, coupled with the increased 
risk of severe symptoms of the virus, lead us to hypothesize that older households will experience 
a higher risk of food insufficiency.  
Methods and Data 
Other studies have employed similar methods to study food spending and insufficiency. 
Restrepo et al. (2021) also estimate the impact of pandemic-induced job loss on food insufficiency 
and expenditures, as well as free food receipt and food sufficiency confidence. They find these 
households spend 15% less on food and were 10% less likely to report food sufficiency. We 
differentiate our first contribution from Restrepo et al. by accounting for the roles of household 
job loss expectations and pre-pandemic household food insufficiency and including households 
that were not working for other reasons.  
Our difference-in-differences framework follows that of Berkowitz and Basu (2021), who 
estimate a 3.88 percentage point difference in food insufficiency risk following the expiration of 
the FPUC for UI beneficiary households using HPS data. However, we critique that their sample 
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restrictions limit the interpretability of their results. While Berkowitz and Basu (2021) limit their 
sample to households that report a loss of household employment income since March 13, 2020, 
and did not use regular income sources to meet spending needs in the past week, we argue that 
these restrictions are opaque. It is not clear whether households reporting employment income loss 
have recovered earnings, changed income sources, or still have a reduced income. Additionally, 
the term “regular income sources” is not well defined. While Berkowitz and Basu (2021) interpret 
the questionnaire’s phrasing of “regular income sources like those received before the pandemic” 
to mean earned income, households may also interpret government benefits as regular income. We 
attempt to address these limitations by estimating our model on the entire working-age sample, a 
subsample of households whose heads did not work in the past week, and households that did not 
use regular income for spending needs. We further differentiate our approach by balancing the two 
groups using inverse-propensity score weighting as done in Bitler et al. (2006). We also account 
for the LWA program by comparing our estimates made with the entire post-FPUC sample to those 
of a subsample excluding observations made after the first LWA checks were received.  
 Raifman et al. (2020) also estimate a difference-in-differences specification to estimate 
the effect of UI in mitigating the rise in food insecurity3 among low- and middle-income 
households experiencing loss of employment during the pandemic. These authors used 
longitudinal data from the Understanding Coronavirus in America study to compare UI recipients 
before and after receiving benefits to those that did not receive UI, finding that UI without the 
$600 weekly supplement reduced food insufficiency by 3.05 percentage points (1.89 weighted) or 
5.13 percentage points (5.63 weighted) with the supplement. Ionescu-Ittu et al. (2014) used a 
 
3 Food insecurity was defined using the food insecurity experience scale by the Food and Agriculture Organization 
of the United Nations 
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difference-in-differences framework to estimate the effect of a $100 monthly benefit increase on 
food insufficiency.  
Difference-in-differences approaches have been used to estimate changes in food spending 
following the introduction of SNAP (Hoynes and Schanzenbach 2009) and the marginal propensity 
to consume food out of SNAP benefits (Hastings and Shapiro 2018). Baker and Yannelis (2017) 
use a difference-in-differences approach to compare spending of government workers affected by 
the 2013 shutdown to those who were not. 
Luong (2020) makes use of the same HPS dataset to evaluate the effects of containment 
policy on food insufficiency. Luong uses an ordered probit regression to estimate the probability 
of food insufficiency, along with OLS estimations of expenses on food to estimate the impact of 
relaxing lockdown policy on food insufficiency. Luong finds that loosening lockdown restrictions 
is associated with increased availability of food in stores and the number of people receiving free 
food, but also increased prices that made food unaffordable for some families. Morales et al. (2020) 
use the HPS as well, applying generalized estimating equation models to conclude that non-White 
households were not more food insecure than White households, but larger households and those 
with older household heads were at higher risk. Ziliak (2020) compares the rise in food 
insufficiency observed in the HPS to prior trends in the Current Population Survey trends and 
compares the rates for adults and the elderly.   
Our paper will contribute to the research concerning the role of UI in mitigating the food 
insufficiency risk resulting from employment loss, and we differentiate our study from others that 
estimate UI effects during the pandemic by accounting for the heterogeneous introduction of the 
LWA. We also consider that truncating the post-expiration observations will provide us with the 
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short-term effect of the FPUC expiration, while the long-term effect of the expiration may be more 
severe. This is the first application of balancing weights to the HPS that we know of. 
3. Data 
For this study, we combined household survey data from the United States Census Bureau’s 
novel Household Pulse Survey (HPS) with state-level economic conditions from the Opportunity 
Insights Economic Tracker (OIET), pandemic data from the Covid Tracking Project, and UI 
benefit information gleaned from state government websites. We describe the data sources and 
manipulations in this section. For a comparison of the HPS and the Current Population Survey, see 
Ziliak (2020). A complete list of variables and descriptions is outlined in Appendix Table A1, with 
accompanying summary statistics in Appendix Table A2.   
Household Pulse Survey 
The HPS dataset covers weeks ranging from April 23, 2020, to January 18, 2021, and 
includes 1,932,450 observations spanning the 50 states and Washington DC. The HPS is a novel 
three-phase survey of US households containing information concerning the social and economic 
impact of the COVID-19 crisis. The data were collected via online Qualtrics survey. Phase one of 
the survey consists of weekly data surveyed from April 23 until July 21, 2020. Household heads 
answered questions about their current employment and demographics, household characteristics 
including food sufficiency status for both the past week and before the pandemic, and spending on 
food, among other questions capturing pandemic-related disruption. Phase two, conducted from 
August 19 through October 26, 2020, consists of biweekly data with the same questions as well as 
additional questions about the application and receipt of government benefits and the sources of 
income used to meet household spending needs in the past week. Phase three currently includes 
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eight surveys administered between October 28, 2020, and March 1, 2021. On average, the three 
phases yield two survey rounds per month. Although most of the questions are identical between 
phases two and three, 2021 observations do not include prior household food sufficiency and are 
therefore omitted from the estimation sample. The HPS dataset contains a panel subset of 
households surveyed two or three times between April 23, 2020, and July 24, 2020, containing 
413,718 observations. For the purposes of this paper, we include all observations.  
The HPS provides fairly detailed technical documentation related to the sample design, 
accuracy of estimates, and implemented procedures dealing with traditionally high non-response 
rates in online surveys.4 The HPS sampling weights are designed to adjust weekly estimates for 
the household non-response, number of adults per household, and demographic coverage. All of 
our estimates use HPS sampling weights. We also note that many variables in the dataset have 
some missing observations; most of the variables with missing data were missing less than 3% of 
responses. The Census Bureau used hot deck imputations to fill in missing demographic data with 
responses from similar participants. Imputations were made for no more than 3% of the responses 
for the gender, Hispanic origin, race, educational attainment, household size, and birth year 
(subtracted from 2020 to generate age variable).  
Measures of Food Insufficiency 
The HPS includes the standard four-category measure for food insufficiency introduced by 
the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) in 1977. Survey participants are asked which 




4 See https://www.census.gov/programs-surveys/household-pulse-survey/technical-documentation.html  
 16 
1 Enough of the kinds of food (I/we) want to eat.  
2 Enough but not always the kinds of food (I/we) want to eat.  
3 Sometimes not enough to eat.  
4 Often not enough to eat.  
The USDA defines food insufficiency as when households sometimes or often do not have 
enough to eat and notes that it is comparable in severity to the designation of very low food 
insecurity.5 For our main dependent variable, we collapse this measure into a binary indicator equal 
to one if the household head selects category 3 or 4. This categorization is consistent with 
convention and existing literature (Gundersen et al. 2017; Berkowitz and Basu 2021; Gundersen 
and Oliveira 2001; Gundersen and Gruber 2001; Ribar and Hamrick 2003; Leete and Bania 2010; 
Rose et al. 1998; Rose and Oliveira 1997). For robustness, we also construct a broad food 
insufficiency definition that includes households which selected category 2 (as done by Gundersen 
and Ribar in 2011, Ziliak in 2020, and Luong in 2020) and estimate an ordered probit model using 
all four categories. For the remainder of this paper, the term food insufficiency refers to categories 
3 and 4, while food insufficiency (broad) also includes category 2.  
Figure 2 illustrates the trends in food insufficiency by household head employment status. 
Individuals who are not working are separated into two groups: not working due to pandemic 
reasons and not working due to other reasons.6  We observe that food insufficiency is much more 
prevalent among households that report not working due to pandemic reasons (19 to 32 percent) 
than those employed or not working for other reasons (7 to 12 percent). Furthermore, the  
 
5 For USDA classification, see https://www.ers.usda.gov/topics/food-nutrition-assistance/food-security-in-the-
us/measurement 
6 Pandemic reasons include being sick with or caring for someone with coronavirus symptoms, furloughed due to 
pandemic-related reduction in business, and laid off due to temporary or permanent closure of business due to 
pandemic. Other reasons include retirement, caring for children or elderly, sick or disabled unrelated to the 
coronavirus, not wanting to be employed, and other reasons. 
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Figure 2: Food Insufficiency by Employment Status 
 
Notes: Shares are weighted using survey sample weights. Week 54 indicates the second week of 2021. The 
second round of stimulus checks were distributed to households between weeks 50 and 54.   
 
prevalence of food insufficiency significantly increased in 2020 for those not working due to the 
pandemic yet remained relatively steady for other households. It is noteworthy that all employment 
categories experienced a drop in food insufficiency rates after the second stimulus checks were 
distributed in 2021, with the largest drop observed for households not working due to the 
pandemic. 
In Appendix Figure A1, we also observe a substantially higher prevalence of food 
insufficiency for Black and Hispanic-headed households than for White or Asian-headed 
households (21-24 vs. 7-10 percent in December 2020). The gender gap is not as striking as the 
racial gap, with a slightly higher reported food insufficiency among female-headed households. 
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Figure 3 visualizes the trends in the specified reasons for food insufficiency, defined broadly. 
Although the initial most-cited reason for food insufficiency was that stores did not have the kind 
of food wanted, the predominant reason quickly shifted to lack of means to afford food. This is 
consistent with reports of supply chain disruptions that reduced food availability.  (McKinsey 
2020). 
In addition to food insufficiency, we also examine household food spending during the 
COVID-19 crisis. The HPS separately asks respondents for the amount spent in the past seven 
days on groceries and prepared meals for the household. We divided these disaggregated 
expenditure measures by an adult equivalence scale and adjusted for food price inflation.7 
Appendix Figure A3 presents the food price fluctuations for US divisions over the period of study. 
Appendix Figure A2 shows the natural log of the adjusted spending measure for each employment 
category. It is interesting that employed households and those not working due to the pandemic 
experience a sharp jump in spending on groceries between weeks 23 and 24, while there is a more 
gradual increase observed for those not working for other reasons. Weeks 23 and 24 correspond 
to the first trough of hospitalizations following the initial wave of the virus. Households may have 
deemed these weeks the safest to return to grocery stores and refill the pantry. Spending on 
prepared meals rises gradually for all groups until becoming steadier around week 30. Employed 
households spend more on prepared meals than those without employment, and those not working 
due to the pandemic tend to spend more than those not working for other reasons. This may be 
because households experiencing a recent income loss have not yet adjusted consumption patterns, 
or because these households have higher unobserved asset levels. 
 
7 The adult equivalence scale was computed to be 1 for the first adult, plus .75 for each additional adult and plus .5 
for each child under 18 in the household. This accounts for the presence of economies of scale, wherein meals can 
be prepared more cheaply per person when more people share a meal. 
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Figure 2: Reasons for Food Insufficiency (Broad) 
 
Notes: Shares are weighted using survey sample weights. Week 54 indicates the second week of 2021. In 
this figure, food insufficient households are broadly defined to include households that have enough to eat, 
but not always the kinds of food they wanted to eat. 
 
Unemployment Insurance 
We consider that UI may mitigate the impact of job loss on food insufficiency. We obtain 
two measures of the emerging unemployment rate—initial regular UI claim rate and the initial UI 
claim rate including the FPUC eligibility expansions—from the Opportunity Insights Economic 
Tracker (OIET). A detailed overview of the dataset can be found at Chetty et al. (2020). We further 
analyze the mitigating effect of UI on food insufficiency by examining the time-varying statutory 
maximum benefit amount. Before the expiration of the FPUC, that is, until July 31, we add $600 
to the measure of pre-pandemic maximum UI benefits from the COVID-19 US State Policy 
Database maintained by the Boston University School of Public Health. These values were taken 
directly from the government websites of each state and are listed for each state in Appendix Figure 
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A3. Following the expiration of the FPUC, we added $300 to the pre-pandemic maximum UI 
benefits to capture the Lost Wages Assistance program benefits.8  
One reservation about our calculation of maximum UI benefits arises from the observation 
that states did not begin to pay LWA benefits after the week of August 1. Instead, a household 
claiming UI for the LWA period received no extra benefits until its state began to pay out the 
claims, and then benefits were received as a lump sum. Additionally, states only paid up to six 
weeks of LWA benefits, and many states ran out of money before paying all six weeks. We cannot 
observe whether households qualify for back pay during the weeks prior to the initial LWA checks 
nor by how much the benefit amount received may differ from the statutory maximum amount. 
For our difference-in-differences specification that excludes observations made after the first 
LWA-boosted benefit checks, we used the estimated first payment date from the LWA Tracker 
detailed in Appendix Table A3.  
Alternatively, we measure UI at the individual level. We employ a binary variable in the 
HPS that takes the value of 1 if the household used UI benefits to meet spending needs in the past 
week and 0 otherwise. We use the UI spending measure as a proxy for UI receipt to determine 
treatment status in our difference-in-differences model. We also use a sister variable that indicates 
whether or not the household used regular, pre-pandemic income sources in constructing our third 
difference-in-differences subsample.  
Extent of the COVID-19 Crisis  
We include variables to capture the extent of the COVID-19 crisis in each state for each 
week. We obtain a measure for new COVID-19 hospitalizations per 100,000 from The COVID 
 
8 We instead added $400 of benefits for Montana, Kentucky, and West Virginia, which opted to increase the LWA 
benefits. We did not add any extra benefits for South Dakota, which did not apply to LWA.  
 21 
Tracking Project. Although COVID-19 positive confirmed cases are often used to measure the 
extent of the crisis, we argue that case measurements are not as comparable among states due to 
differences in COVID testing rates. In contrast, hospitalizations better capture the severity of the 
crisis. 
We also use a measure of combined credit and debit card spending from the OIET to 
capture the general economic conditions in each state for each week as a covariate. We hypothesize 
that higher consumer spending is an indicator of a stronger economic recovery and will predict 
lower food insufficiency and higher food spending. Although this measure excludes cash 
payments, we believe this bias is less pronounced during the pandemic due to a consumer shift 
away from cash.9 
Summary Statistics 
Appendix Table A2 provides the weighted means and standard errors of each variable by 
food sufficiency. Household heads that report more severe food insufficiency prior to the pandemic 
are more likely to report food insufficiency in the past week. We also document higher food 
insufficiency rates among households whose heads were not working in the past week. We can see 
that food insufficient households tend to be larger, report a 2019 income less than $50,000, and 
have heads that are female, Black, Hispanic or mixed race, unmarried, and hold less than a 
bachelor’s degree. Households in states with higher COVID-19 hospitalization rates and initial UI 
claim rates are also more likely to be food insufficient. The average maximum state UI benefits 





4. The Empirical Model  
4.1 Baseline Model 
We begin by estimating the food insufficiency equation as follows:  
𝑌𝑖𝑠𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛾𝐽𝑖𝑠𝑡 + 𝛿𝑌𝑖0 + 𝛽𝑋𝑖𝑠𝑡 + 𝜃𝑡 + 𝜇𝑠 + 𝜖𝑖𝑠𝑡 .        (1)  
The subscript i indicates observations made for the individual household head and 
corresponding household, t indicates the week of the observation, and s indicates the state of 
household residence. In the base model, Y is a binary variable equal to 1 if the household reports 
sometimes or often not having enough food in week t. We later expand the model to explore 
alternative measures of Y: broadly defined food insufficiency and weekly household spending on 
both groceries and prepared meals. We also estimate equation (1) as an ordered probit model with 
four categories for food insufficiency.  
In our specification, J is a categorical variable capturing the household head’s job status in 
three categories: employed in the past week, not working due to pandemic reasons, and not 
working due to other reasons. 𝑌𝑖0 captures the pre-pandemic initial condition of binary household 
food sufficiency status prior to March 13, 2020. Since the food insufficiency question is 
subjectively evaluated by each household head, including this measure in our specification helps 
account for reporting bias. The 𝑋𝑖𝑠𝑡 vector captures three control vectors (𝑋𝑖0, 𝑋𝑖𝑡 , 𝑋𝑠𝑡). The first 
component captures time-constant household characteristics, including the respondent’s gender, 
ethnicity, educational attainment, age, and household 2019 pre-tax income. The second component 
captures household characteristics which may vary over time, including the expectation of future 
income loss, marital status and household size. The last component accounts for time-varying 
state-wide indicators for the log of the average COVID-19 hospitalization rate, emerging 
unemployment rate, and combined credit and debit card spending. The term 𝜃𝑡 captures week fixed 
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and  𝜇𝑠 captures state fixed effects. Finally, we have an unobserved time-varying determinant of 
food insufficiency, 𝜖𝑖𝑠𝑡 , which we assume to be normally distributed and uncorrelated with the 
other variables in the model. 
We include state and time fixed effects to counter the threat of omitted variable bias to our 
model. States differ in unobserved characteristics that may affect food insufficiency, such as social 
safety net generosity before policy extensions and employment concentration across different 
industries. Our state fixed effects account for these time-invariant effects, and our week fixed 
effects account for factors that affect all states over time.  
4.2 Unemployment Insurance Policy   
 Next, we consider that unemployment insurance may mitigate the effect of losing 
employment due to the pandemic on food insufficiency. To test this hypothesis, we estimate the 
following expansion of equation (1):  
𝑌𝑖𝑠𝑡 = α + γ1𝐽𝑖𝑠𝑡 + γ2𝑈𝐼𝑖𝑠𝑡 + γ3(𝐽𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑈𝐼𝑖𝑠𝑡) + δ𝑌𝑖0 + β𝑋𝑖𝑠𝑡 + θ𝑡 + μ𝑠 + ϵ𝑖𝑠𝑡 .  (2)  
We let UI be a vector that captures the state-weekly new regular and expanded eligibility 
UI claim rates, the log of statutory maximum UI, and an indicator for whether the household used 
UI benefits to meet spending needs in the past week. We critique the statutory maximum UI, which 
assume the LWA benefits following the expiration of the FPUC until the end of 2020 for all states. 
In reality, states did not begin to pay out LWA benefits until late August, and households received 
lump sum back pay from missing weeks until the beginning of November. See Table A4 in the 
Appendix for the estimated date of the LWA payment in each state. We address our critiques in 
the following subsection.  
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We refine the model by presenting a more advanced difference-in-differences framework 
that allows us to estimate the causal impact of the FPUC expiration and quantify how that effect 
changes over time.  
4.3 Difference-in-Differences Framework  
We expand on the difference-in-differences framework employed by Berkowitz and Basu 
(2021) to estimate the causal effect of a $600 reduction in maximum UI benefits on food 
insufficiency for UI beneficiary households. We compare this effect across three different samples: 
the entire sample for which we observe UI spending, a subsample including only households 
whose heads did not work in the past week, and a subsample including only households that did 
not use regular, pre-pandemic income to meet spending needs in the past week. We estimate  
𝑌𝑖𝑠𝑡 = α + 𝜆𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡 + γ(𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑡) + φJ +  δ𝑌𝑖0 + β𝑋𝑖𝑠𝑡 + θ𝑡 + μ𝑠 + ϵ𝑖𝑠𝑡 .          (3)  
The Treated variable is specified to be the UI spending variable that takes the value of 1 if 
household i used UI benefits to meet spending needs in the week prior to t and 0 otherwise. Post 
takes the value of 0 if t falls during the period of extended UI benefits and 1 after the extension 
expires. We account for the inconsistent transition from the FPUC to the LWA by restricting the 
estimation sample to observations that occurred before the LWA payments began. In doing so, we 
isolate a larger difference in the pre- and post-expiration periods and maintain a consistent benefit 
gap across states. We present the results for estimating equation (3) for each of the three groups 
identified above twice—once with the entire post-expiration period and once with the truncated 
post-expiration period.  
We hypothesize that the effect of the program expiration will increase with time, and the 
difference-in-differences framework allows us to investigate the time-varying treatment effect. We 
estimate the margins of weekly effects derived from the following tweaked equation:  
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𝑌𝑖𝑠𝑡 = α + λ 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡 + Σ𝑗=1
𝑇  γj(𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡 ∗  II{ j = t }) + 𝜑J + δ𝑌𝑖0 + β𝑋𝑖𝑠𝑡 + θ𝑡 + μ𝑠 + ϵ𝑖𝑠𝑡 .          (4) 
 The term 𝐼𝐼{ 𝑗 = 𝑡 } takes the value of 1 if the observation occurred in week t and 0 
otherwise. It differs from equation (3) in that each week j has an associated treatment effect  γj 
rather than one treatment effect γ for all post-expiration weeks.   
We consider that our model may be biased due concerns that households may select into 
treatment. Food insufficient households are probably more likely to seek income sources to 
alleviate the negative effects of lack of food. This may cause food insufficient households to seek 
out and apply for UI benefits, introducing reverse causality into the model. Additionally, we are 
concerned that households may switch between treatment groups. That is, households may exist 
in our untreated group that previously received UI, which may cause us to underestimate the 
treatment effect. Although we cannot directly address these potential sources of endogeneity, we 
attempt to address concerns about the correlation between treatment and the error term through 
use of inverse-propensity weights, which we discuss in the following subsection.   
 We note that FPUC-bolstered UI exceeds the weekly earnings of 76% of UI-eligible 
workers, and thus may disincentivize employment for these workers (Ganong et al. 2020). If this 
is true, we should be concerned about selection bias affecting our estimations for the sample of 
non-working households. We assess the validity of the concern by measuring the correlation 
between UI generosity and employment. We estimate two probit models of the likelihood of not 
working in the past week and of household employment income loss since March 13, 2020 as a 
function of the statutory maximum UI benefits. In Appendix Table A4, we present a negative 
correlation between not working and UI generosity and no significant association between income 
loss and UI generosity. Other studies have found higher UI under the FPUC had no significant 
impact on employment using an event-study design with HPS data (Dube 2020) and event-study 
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and regression designs with employment data from a private firm (Finamor and Scott 2020). 
Therefore, we allay concerns of selection bias in response to UI generosity in our sample. 
Our third sample includes only households that do not report meeting spending needs with 
regular, pre-pandemic income sources. This measure is not clearly defined; we consider that some 
households may consider UI or other government benefits “regular income.” How do these 
households meet their spending needs, if not through regular income or UI? We examine their 
spending resources and find that 35% use money from savings or selling assets, 30% use credit 
cards or loans, 20% used money borrowed from friends or family, and 19% used money from 
stimulus payments. SNAP payments were used to meet needs for about 9% of these households 
and deferred or forgiven payments were used by about 6%. However, we consider these income-
constrained households a useful comparison. 
Inverse-Propensity Weights 
 We consider that our model may be biased if the treated households differ significantly 
from our untreated households in ways we cannot observe, causing a correlation between treatment 
status and the error term ϵ. We address this concern by applying inverse-propensity weights to 
make our groups more similar in terms of observable characteristics, in hopes that the groups 
become more similar in unobserved characteristics at the same time. We assume that treatment is 
independent of potential outcomes after conditioning on observed characteristics.  
We balance the pre-FPUC expiration groups on the following covariates: household size, 
prior household income and food sufficiency status, household head’s gender, age, ethnicity, 
marital status and education level. Appendix Table A5 shows the difference in means between the 
groups for each covariate before and after balancing. To calculate the weights, we employ a probit 
model with state and week fixed effects to regress treatment status on the aforementioned 
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covariates. We compute weights separately for each of the three estimation samples. We weight 
treated households by the given survey sample weight divided by the conditional probability of 
being treated given the observed characteristics. We weight untreated households by the given 
survey sample weight divided by the conditional probability of treatment subtracted from 1. The 
last column of Appendix Table A5 shows the differences in group means after applying the 
weights, which have diminished or become insignificant for all covariates. Although inverse-
propensity weighting theoretically yields no difference in observed characteristics for treated and 
untreated groups, we still see some differences due to the inclusion of survey sample weights in 
the calculation. We make the important note that our qualitative conclusions hold whether we 
adjust the estimates using inverse-propensity weights or not. 
5. Results  
We present the results from the empirical models described in the preceding section.  
5.1 Baseline Model  
The results from estimating equation (1) are presented in Table 1. We find the direct effect of 
COVID-19 on food insufficiency is significant and positive—a 1% increase in COVID-19 
hospitalization rate increases food insufficiency by .3 percentage points, holding all else equal. 
Additionally, COVID-19 has an indirect effect on food insufficiency households that experience 
pandemic-related job loss, leading to a 4.3 percentage point increase in food insufficiency for those 
households. This increase in food insufficiency vulnerability is more than three times that of 
households whose heads were not working due to reasons unrelated to the pandemic, which 




Table 1. Estimation of Equation (1) with Various Measures of Food Insufficiency 
      







Spending on  
groceries 




            
Log of COVID-19 
hospitalization rate 0.003*** 0.009*** 0.011** -0.040*** 0.031*** 
 (0.001) (0.002) (0.005) (0.007) (0.006) 
Not working, pandemic 
reasons 0.043*** 0.070*** -0.088*** -0.360*** 0.264*** 
 (0.002) (0.003) (0.008) (0.013) (0.010) 
Not working, other 
reasons 0.013*** 0.029*** -0.027*** -0.305*** 0.116*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.007) (0.010) (0.008) 
Household expects 
income loss 0.053*** 0.134*** 0.036*** -0.106*** 0.452*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.005) (0.009) (0.007) 
Pre-pandemic food 
insufficiency - 2 0.012*** 0.572*** -0.017*** -0.096*** 1.202*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.006) (0.009) (0.008) 
Pre-pandemic food 
insufficiency - 3 0.640*** 0.605*** -0.108*** -0.180*** 2.224*** 
 (0.004) (0.003) (0.012) (0.019) (0.016) 
Pre-pandemic food 
insufficiency - 4 0.780*** 0.602*** -0.418*** -0.435*** 3.431*** 
 (0.006) (0.004) (0.032) (0.039) (0.035) 
Household size 0.003*** 0.006*** -0.090*** -0.085*** 0.021*** 
 (0.000) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Female 0.002 0.015*** -0.002 -0.109*** 0.045*** 
 (0.001) (0.002) (0.005) (0.007) (0.006) 
Age 0.004*** 0.009*** 0.028*** 0.011*** 0.034*** 
 (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) 
Black, non-Hispanic  0.009*** 0.001 0.059*** 0.358*** 0.018* 
 (0.002) (0.003) (0.009) (0.013) (0.011) 
Asian, non-Hispanic -0.017*** 0.000 0.046*** 0.181*** -0.039*** 
 (0.002) (0.004) (0.011) (0.018) (0.013) 
Mixed or other non-
Hispanic race 0.014*** 0.034*** 0.002 0.101*** 0.123*** 
 (0.003) (0.004) (0.011) (0.017) (0.014) 
Hispanic, any race -0.005** 0.005 0.150*** 0.362*** -0.015 
 (0.002) (0.003) (0.008) (0.012) (0.010) 
Married -0.015*** -0.014*** 0.095*** 0.006 -0.081*** 
 (0.001) (0.002) (0.005) (0.008) (0.007) 
High school degree or 
equivalent -0.006 0.019*** -0.136*** -0.223*** 0.040*** 
 (0.004) (0.005) (0.013) (0.022) (0.015) 
Bachelor’s degree -0.026*** -0.021*** -0.168*** -0.274*** -0.127*** 
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 (0.004) (0.005) (0.014) (0.023) (0.016) 
Graduate degree -0.023*** -0.028*** -0.167*** -0.390*** -0.154*** 
 (0.004) (0.005) (0.014) (0.023) (0.016) 
Income category 2 -0.020*** 0.002 0.028** 0.095*** -0.037*** 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.012) (0.018) (0.014) 
Income category 3 -0.033*** -0.001 0.050*** 0.136*** -0.067*** 
 (0.003) (0.004) (0.011) (0.017) (0.013) 
Income category 4 -0.043*** -0.022*** 0.101*** 0.211*** -0.137*** 
 (0.003) (0.004) (0.011) (0.016) (0.012) 
Income category 5 -0.060*** -0.065*** 0.143*** 0.332*** -0.289*** 
 (0.003) (0.004) (0.011) (0.016) (0.013) 
Income category 6 -0.068*** -0.094*** 0.220*** 0.440*** -0.409*** 
 (0.003) (0.004) (0.011) (0.016) (0.013) 
Income category 7 -0.068*** -0.132*** 0.284*** 0.579*** -0.566*** 
 (0.003) (0.004) (0.012) (0.017) (0.015) 
Income category 8 -0.066*** -0.163*** 0.392*** 0.764*** -0.744*** 
 (0.003) (0.004) (0.012) (0.019) (0.016) 
Unknown prior income -0.049*** -0.057*** 0.089*** 0.335*** -0.241*** 
 (0.003) (0.004) (0.013) (0.019) (0.013) 
Initial UI claim rate 0.000 0.002 0.013* 0.002 0.003 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.007) (0.010) (0.008) 
Credit and debit card 
spending -0.034 0.002 0.031 0.284** -0.102 
 (0.021) (0.028) (0.079) (0.117) (0.103) 
/cut1     1.339*** 
     (0.051) 
/cut2     3.004*** 
     (0.052) 
/cut3     4.390*** 
     (0.054) 
Constant 0.007 0.031** 3.789*** 3.220***  
 (0.009) (0.012) (0.037) (0.055)  
      
Observations 1,337,971 1,337,971 1,235,427 1,226,189 1,337,971 
R-squared 0.468 0.447 0.060 0.070  
Notes: Results of columns 1-4 are from linear regression estimations of equation (1), and column 5 shows ordered 
probit estimates of equation (1). The cut points for the ordered probit indicate probability cutoffs between 
categories. Comparison groups are household head working in past seven days, prior food sufficiency, non-Hispanic 
White, less than high school degree, and prior household income less than $25,000. Squared age is omitted. All 
estimations are weighted using survey sample weights and include state and week fixed effects. Robust standard 
errors are shown in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
We observe that an increase in COVID-19 hospitalizations has an opposite effect on 
household spending for groceries and prepared meals. That is, a 1% increase in hospitalization rate 
leads to a 1.1% increase in grocery spending and a 4% decrease in spending on prepared meals. 
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These findings support the hypothesis that households hoard groceries in response to higher 
pandemic severity. This change in behavior may also be motivated by fear of illness. Although we 
have no way of differentiating prepared meals consumed in restaurants from those consumed as 
take-out at home, grocery stores may be perceived as safer than restaurants.  
Households expecting employment income loss experience a 5.3 percentage point increase 
in food insufficiency despite a 3.6% increase in spending on groceries. These households also 
spend 10.6% less on prepared meals than those not anticipating a loss of employment income. 
When taken together, these observations indicate that households are probably stockpiling 
groceries while conserving money by eating out less to smooth consumption in anticipation of 
income disruption.  
Larger households and households with older, unmarried, Black, mixed race, or Hispanic 
heads experience greater rates of food insufficiency, while having a bachelor’s degree or higher 
protects against food insufficiency. Although prior literature finds female-headed households are 
more food insufficient, we find no significant difference in conventionally defined food 
insufficiency. Unsurprisingly, relatively higher categories of 2019 household income are more 
protective against food insufficiency. Although Ribar and Hamrick (2003) found that only 79% of 
food insufficient households remained insufficient after a two-year period, indicating low 
persistence, we observe that households reporting greater degrees of pre-pandemic food 
insufficiency are increasingly likely to report food insufficiency during the pandemic. This 
indicates that the pandemic makes it more difficult for vulnerable households to escape food 
insufficiency.  
We observe a handful of noteworthy differences in columns 2 and 6. Female-headed 
households are more likely to experience broad food insufficiency, and this predictor stays 
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significant in the ordered probit model. However, we also see the differences in broad food 
insufficiency between White and Black, Asian, and Hispanic households disappear. In the ordered 
probit model, Hispanic households are not predicted to have higher food insufficiency, and Black 
households are barely significant in predicting higher food insufficiency. When defined broadly, 
the rates of food insufficiency are not statistically different for households that earned less than 
$50,000 in 2019.  
While we expect higher food insufficiency for groups that spent less on groceries and/or 
prepared meals in the previous week, we find that food insufficiency rates increase despite higher 
mean weekly spending for households with heads who are older, Black, or mixed race. Conversely, 
more educated households spend less on food despite maintaining lower food sufficiency rates. 
This could be because more educated households may adjust shopping behavior as discussed in 
Section 2 more easily, while these behaviors might be less common for older, Black or mixed-race 
households. There is a higher concentration of minorities and those holding less than a high school 
degree as well lower vehicle ownership in US Census tracts classified as food deserts, where a 
substantial proportion of residents have low access to supermarkets or large grocery stores (Dutko 
et al. 2012). These populations might be particularly vulnerable to food supply shocks and have 
limited ability to adapt spending behavior in response to rising prices. In a study of food 
insufficiency in food deserts among the elderly, Fitzpatrick et al. (2015) find that not owning a 
vehicle is associated with food insufficiency, and this effect might be exacerbated by the reduction 
in public transport observed during the pandemic. While we cannot observe vehicle ownership or 
residency in our data, this is one possible explanation for why Black, Hispanic and older 
households suffer greater food insufficiency.  
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5.2 Mitigating Effect of Unemployment Insurance  
 We present the results of equation (2) in Table 2, where we interact the household head’s 
job status with the following in turn: a binary indicator of whether the household used UI for 
spending needs in the past week, the maximum statutory UI benefits, in hundreds, and emerging 
unemployment as measured by the regular and FPUC-expanded eligibility UI claim rates. Our 
estimation for column 2 excludes data from the first six survey waves, as the questions concerning 
spending resources were added in the seventh wave.  
Our estimation of γ3 in column 1 indicates that without UI, pandemic-induced job loss is 
associated with a 6.1 percentage point increase in food insufficiency risk. However, receipt of UI 
mitigates 1.4 percentage points of this elevated risk. When food insufficiency is measured broadly, 
we find that pandemic-induced job loss is associated with a 7.9 percentage point increase in risk 
for households without UI, and the effect is reduced by 2.6 percentage points when UI is used for 
spending needs. It’s interesting to note that UI protects households not working for other reasons 
from broad food insufficiency by a similar magnitude (2.3 percentage points) but has no effect on 
conventionally defined food insufficiency rates for these households.  
 We also present evidence that higher statutory maximum UI benefits provide incrementally 
more food insufficiency protection. We find that a $100 increase in maximum weekly UI is 
associated with a .7 percentage point decrease in food insufficiency rate for households with 
pandemic-induced job loss. While our calculation of the maximum UI variable assumes that LWA 
benefits were administered for all weeks following the FPUC expiration until the end of the 
program in December, our understanding that the additional benefits were capped at six weeks and 
withheld for weeks until conferred in a lump sum causes us to question the usefulness of this 
estimate.  
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Table 2. Estimate of Food Insufficiency for Job Status Interacted with Statutory Maximum 
UI Benefits 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES 




UI and PUC 
Claim Rate 
UI Claim Rate 
Panel 1. Conventional Food Insufficiency 
     
𝛄𝟏) Not working, pandemic reasons 0.061*** 0.115*** 0.058*** 0.057*** 
 (0.005) (0.011) (0.004) (0.004) 
𝛄𝟏) Not working, other reasons 0.014*** 0.021*** 0.016*** 0.016*** 
 (0.002) (0.007) (0.003) (0.003) 
𝛄𝟐) UI -0.003 0.001 0.002** 0.003** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.001) (0.002) 
𝛄𝟑) (Not working, pandemic reasons) * (UI)  -0.014** -0.007*** -0.010*** -0.015*** 
 (0.007) (0.001) (0.002) (0.003) 
𝛄𝟑) (Not working, other reasons) * (UI) 0.011 -0.001 -0.002 -0.003 
 (0.007) (0.001) (0.002) (0.003) 
Observations 939,345 1,337,971 1,337,971 1,337,971 
R-squared 0.455 0.468 0.468 0.468 
Panel 2. Broad Food Insufficiency 
     
𝛄𝟏) Not working, pandemic reasons 0.079*** 0.167*** 0.098*** 0.096*** 
 (0.005) (0.012) (0.004) (0.004) 
𝛄𝟏) Not working, other reasons 0.034*** 0.065*** 0.035*** 0.036*** 
 (0.003) (0.009) (0.003) (0.003) 
𝛄𝟐) UI 0.049*** 0.006 0.005*** 0.009*** 
 (0.005) (0.004) (0.001) (0.002) 
𝛄𝟑) (Not working, pandemic reasons) * (UI)  -0.026*** -0.010*** -0.019*** -0.028*** 
 (0.008) (0.001) (0.003) (0.004) 
𝛄𝟑) (Not working, other reasons) * (UI) -0.023** -0.004*** -0.005** -0.009*** 
 (0.009) (0.001) (0.002) (0.003) 
Observations 939,345 1,337,971 1,337,971 1,337,971 
R-squared 0.447 0.447 0.447 0.447 
Notes: Results are from linear regression estimations of equation (2), where the UI variable interacted with job 
status is noted in the column header. The dependent variable for Panel 1 is households that sometimes or often did 
not have enough food, and for Panel 2 it also includes households without the kinds of food wanted. Comparison 
group is household head was working in past seven days. Omitted controls include expected loss of household 
income, prior food insufficiency, prior income category, household size, household head’s gender, age, ethnicity and 
marital status, and state-level COVID-19 hospitalization rate and combined credit and debit card spending. All 
estimations are weighted using sample survey weights and include state and week fixed effects. Robust standard 
errors are shown in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  
 
 Since the actual LWA benefits received were only supplemented for six weeks, we estimate 
the effect of a smaller reduction in UI than was truly experienced by Americans. For this reason, 
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we believe our estimate of a .7 percentage point drop in risk to be biased upward and larger than 
the true effect. We further address the LWA program complications in the next subsection.  
Columns 3 and 4 provide evidence that higher emerging unemployment is protective 
against food insufficiency. Specifically, a 1 percentage point increase in expanded eligibility UI 
claims is associated with a 1 percentage point decline in food insufficiency rates for households 
with pandemic-induced job loss. This shows that households in states that provide more UI support 
are more protected against the risk of food insufficiency associated with pandemic-induced job 
loss. This effect is robust to including only regular UI claims in the insured unemployment rate 
and robust to using different measures of food insufficiency.  
Interestingly, we find that no measure of UI significantly offsets the risk of food 
insufficiency associated with not working for other reasons when food insufficiency is 
conventionally defined. However, all four measures are significant in mitigating the effect on 
broadly defined food insufficiency. This indicates that UI programs still provide some support for 
these households, although this effect is not as pronounced.  
5.3 Difference-in-Differences Estimates   
In Table 3, we present the estimated impact of a $600 per week reduction in UI benefits 
from our difference-in-differences framework. Column 1 presents equation (3) estimates using our 
full working-age sample, while Column 2 restricts the sample to households whose heads did not 
work in the past week. Finally, Column 3 restricts the sample to households that did not use regular, 
pre-pandemic income sources for spending needs in the past week.  
Panel 1 includes all data from 2020 and can be interpreted as the long-term effect of the 
program expiration. In comparison, Panel 2 excludes observations made after the first LWA checks 
were received and can be interpreted as the short-term effect of the policy. 
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Table 3. Difference-in-Differences Estimated Change in Food Insufficiency for UI 
Beneficiaries After FPUC Expiration 
 
  (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES Full Sample Not Working Non-Regular Income  
Panel 1 – Full Time Period 
    
Treated -0.020*** -0.030*** -0.049*** 
 (0.004) (0.006) (0.007) 
(Treated) * (Post-FPUC) 0.032*** 0.038*** 0.042*** 
 (0.004) (0.008) (0.008) 
    
F-statistic 0.877 0.783 0.880 
Observations 939,345 264,582 222,061 
R-squared 0.425 0.443 0.424 
Panel 2 – Before LWA  
    
Treated -0.015*** -0.026*** -0.046*** 
 (0.004) (0.006) (0.007) 
(Treated) * (Post-FPUC) 0.021*** 0.032*** 0.036*** 
 (0.005) (0.009) (0.010) 
    
F-statistic 0.877 0.779 0.878 
Observations 610,594 178,003 143,048 
R-squared 0.417 0.439 0.419 
Notes: Column 1 includes the full sample for which we have information about UI use, while column 2 restricts the 
sample to household heads that did not work in the past week, and column 3  restricts the sample to households that 
did not use regular, pre-pandemic income sources for spending needs in the past week. Panel 2 also excludes 
observations made after the first LWA checks were received. Results are from linear regression estimations of 
equation (3). Post-FPUC effects are captured by week fixed effects and therefore omitted. Controls include expected 
loss of household income, prior food insufficiency, prior income category, household size, household head’s job 
status, gender, age, ethnicity and marital status, and state-level credit and debit card spending. All estimations are 
weighted using inverse-propensity and sample survey weights, and all include state and week fixed effects. Robust 
standard errors are shown in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
We also note that Panel 1 estimates are biased downward due to the additional benefits conferred 
through the LWA program, and therefore can be read as lower-bound estimates of the true effect. 
The significant negative coefficient on treatment for all estimations shows that our prior 
conclusion that FPUC-bolstered UI reduced food insufficiency is robust to different estimation 
sample restrictions, although this is no surprise. We quantify the reduced food insufficiency risk 
attributable to FPUC-bolstered UI receipt as between 1.5 and 2 percentage points for all working 
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age households, 2.6 to 3 percentage points for non-working households, and 4.6 to 4.9 for 
households with non-regular income.  
 Notably, we find significant positive effects for UI receipt after the expiration of additional 
benefits that are larger in magnitude than the negative effects pre-FPUC expiration for all estimates 
except for the non-regular income groups. This indicates that base UI without the additional $600 
weekly benefit is not enough to reduce food insufficiency risk for unemployed households during 
the pandemic. We observe this effect in the weeks before the LWA, quantifying the short-term risk 
to increase by 2.1, 3.2, and 3.6 percentage point increases the three groups, respectively. Our long-
term estimates of increased food insufficiency risk, which may be considered lower-bound 
estimates, rise to 3.2, 3.8 and 4.2 percentage points for each group, respectively. We expected the 
increases to be larger for the non-working and non-regular income subsamples, as these groups 
likely face higher liquidity constraints that are associated with higher food insufficiency risk. 
We compare our estimates to that of Berkowitz and Basu (2021), who found a 3.88 
percentage point increase in post-expiration food insufficiency for non-regular income households 
that also reporting a loss of household income since the pandemic. We find slightly lower estimates 
for the short-term effects of the policy expiration but find a similar magnitude effect in the long-
term for non-working households. We also consider the results of Raifman et al. (2020), which 
estimate that FPUC-bolstered UI reduces food insecurity by 5.63 percentage points, and UI without 
the supplement reduced food insecurity by 1.89 percentage points in households earning less than 
$75,000 that experienced job loss during the pandemic.  
Figure 4 depicts the margins of each week by treatment status for each of the estimations 
presented in Table 3. Upon visual inspection, we see the food insufficiency trends before the 
FPUC expiration are similar between groups in all three panels, lending support for the validity  
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Notes: Estimated margins of each week on food insufficiency from linear regression of treatment status interacted 
with dummy variable for week. Estimates use the full post-FPUC observation period. Controls include employment 
status, expected loss of household income, prior food insufficiency, prior income category, household size, household 
head’s gender, age, ethnicity and marital status, and state-level COVID-19 hospitalization rate, initial UI claim rate 
and credit and debit card spending. Week and state fixed effects included. Estimates presented with 95% confidence 
intervals. All estimates weighted using inverse-propensity and sample survey weights. 
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of our model. We find that balancing our estimation sample on observed covariates before the 
treatment makes the groups similar at the start of observation. However, we still observe higher 
food insufficiency rates for UI-recipient households in Panels A and B, which indicates that our 
groups still differ by unobservable characteristics. groups In Panel C, the food insufficiency rates 
between the groups have considerably more overlap in the pre-expiration period, and we note 
that the food insufficiency rates are alarmingly high at 25%. 
While we might consider that food insufficiency rates at week 29 are indicative of 
consumption-smoothing behavior in anticipation of the policy change, we observe a similar 
increase in food insufficiency for the control group. Therefore, we cannot attribute the rise in food 
insufficiency before the policy to anticipation. For all panels, we observe a general upward trend 
in food insufficiency rates for UI-reliant households, and a slighter upward trend in our control 
group in Panel C.   
We also observe a marked dip in food insufficiency for week 38 in all panels, which is most 
pronounced in Panel C. Week 38 was administered between September 16 and September 28, and 
we note that 16 states sent the first LWA checks in this interval, and another 16 states sent out the 
first checks in the preceding interval corresponding to week 36. We also observe a dip in food 
insufficiency at week 48 for Panels A and C, but we observe the drop in our control groups as well.   
For Panels A and B, we observe a significant diversion in food insufficiency rates 
immediately following the FPUC expiration; the gaps remain significant and grow with time. In 
Panel C, we also see a gap in food insufficiency following the expiration of the program, but it 
varies in magnitude more than the other groups. The food insufficiency rate for the treated group 
varies much more for Panel C in between weeks 34 and 44, indicating that these households are 
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most impacted by benefit fluctuations from the LWA policy, likely due to liquidity restrictions that 
limit the households’ ability to smooth consumption when faced with income volatility. 
Food Spending 
We now turn to examine the effect of the FPUC expiration on weekly grocery and prepared 
meal spending. The results of equation (3) are presented in Appendix Table A6, and the margins 
derived from equation (4) are displayed in Appendix Figures A4 and A5. Surprisingly, we observe 
higher weekly grocery spending for UI-reliant households under the FPUC for all samples despite 
higher food insufficiency rates for the same time period. We also observe lower weekly prepared 
meal spending for the full sample panel, so grocery spending may be higher for UI-reliant 
households because a higher the food budget may be dedicated to groceries. After the expiration 
of the extended benefit amount, the grocery spending gap between groups in the full sample closes 
and begins to reverse. For both non-working and non-regular income subsamples, the gap also 
lessens.  In comparison, weekly prepared meal spending is similar between treatment groups for 
the restricted samples, and post-expiration spending falls for the treated group. For the unrestricted 
sample, UI-recipient households spend less before the expiration 
We observe higher grocery spending in week 36 relative to other post-FPUC weeks, which 
may correspond to receipt or anticipated receipt of LWA checks. Since food insufficiency dipped 
in the following survey wave (week 38), we see higher food spending have a slightly lagged effect 
on reducing food insufficiency.  
6. Conclusions 
We use data from a novel household survey to study the role of the COVID-19 pandemic 
in the drastic increase in food insufficiency in the US. We quantify the effects of COVID-19 and 
pandemic-induced employment loss in determining household food insufficiency and the efficacy 
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of UI in mitigating that effect. We build upon preexisting literature that estimates the mitigating 
effect of UI by applying inverse-propensity weights to the groups in our difference-in-differences 
specification. Additionally, this paper presents the first attempt that we know of to address the 
confounding effect of the LWA program in estimating UI efficacy during the COVID-19 crisis.  
We document the direct effect of the pandemic on food insufficiency: each 1% increase in 
the state COVID-19 hospitalization rate is associated with .3 percentage point increase in food 
insufficiency. Additionally, we find that households with pandemic-induced job loss have a 4.5 
percentage point higher risk of food insufficiency than those employed. Without unemployment 
insurance, this risk rises to 6.1 percentage points.  
Although some jobs have been recovered since the beginning of the COVID-19 crisis, at 
the time of writing the unemployment rate in the United States remains at 6.2% (Bureau of Labor 
Statistics 2021). UI program expansions have been enacted to soften the economic blow of the 
pandemic for those affected by employment loss. Policymakers should know that under the FPUC 
expansion, UI reduced food insufficiency by 2 percentage points for the general population, or 3 
for non-working households. However, this effect is offset by the reduction following the FPUC 
expiration. Policymakers should consider that base UI alone is not enough to prevent a rise in food 
insufficiency rates among beneficiary households.  
We recognize some limitations in our study. First, UI benefit receipt may be endogenous 
with respect to food insufficiency. If there are unobserved factors that determine UI spending that 
are correlated with food insufficiency, for example, food insufficiency overpowering any effect of 
stigma that might deter an applicant, we would be concerned about the validity of our estimates. 
One way to overcome this limitation would be to instrument UI spending with UI eligibility, as 
suggested by Gruber (1997). The HPS was designed to provide a near real-time snapshot of the 
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US during the crisis, and therefore favored brevity over detail. Although our data prevents us from 
instrumenting UI receipt with eligibility, future research may make use of more comprehensive 
datasets.  
The LWA program also presents challenges in measuring the maximum UI benefit receipt 
due to its inconsistent implementation. Although we approximate when the first checks were sent 
out in each state, we don’t know when the households in our sample received benefits, nor for how 
many weeks of back pay they were eligible.  Unfortunately, our data precludes us from knowing 
the asset level, true income, or true value of received UI benefits for each household (which is not 
necessarily equal to the maximum amount).  
Despite these limitations, our paper offers valuable insight to the food sufficiency facet of 
the developing COVID-19 pandemic literature. In the future, we hope to expand our research to 
consider the effects of UI benefit volatility during the pandemic and consider the second increase 
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Appendix Table A1: Variable Descriptions 
Variable Name Vector Variable Description Type 
Level of food 
insufficiency  
𝑌𝑖𝑠𝑡 Based on the survey question: 
In the last 7 days, which of these statements best describes the food 
eaten in your household? 
1 = Enough of the kinds of food (I/we) want to eat 
2 = Enough but not always the kinds of food (I/we) want to eat 
3 = Sometimes not enough to eat 
4 = Often not enough to eat 
Categorical 
Food insufficiency 𝑌𝑖𝑠𝑡 = 1 if level of food insufficiency is 3 or 4 Binary 
Food insufficiency 
(broad) 
𝑌𝑖𝑠𝑡 = 1 if level of food insufficiency is 2, 3 or 4 Binary 
Spending on food 
at home  
𝑌𝑖𝑠𝑡 The log of real spending on food to prepare and eat at home per 
adult equivalent. 
Based on the survey question: During the last 7 days, how much 
money did you and your household spend on food at supermarkets, 
grocery stores, online, and other places you buy food to prepare 
and eat at home? 
The reported amount is further divided by the household adult 
equivalency value (1 for the first adult, 0.75 for each additional 
adult, and 0.5 for each child under 18 years old), and it is adjusted 
for inflation using the Bureau of Labor Statistics’ Food CPI for 
Urban Consumers in prices of June 2019. 
Continuous 
Spending on food 
away from home 
𝑌𝑖𝑠𝑡 The log of real spending on prepared meals per adult equivalent. 
Based on the survey question: During the last 7 days, how much 
money did you and your household spend on prepared meals, 
including eating out, fast food, and carry out or delivered meals? 




𝑌𝑖0 The 4-category level of household food insufficiency prior to 
March 13, 2020 
Categorical 
Employment status 𝐽𝑖𝑠𝑡 HH head employment status 
= 0 if HH head worked for pay or profit in past 7 days 
= 1 if HH head not working due to pandemic reasons 




𝑋𝑖𝑠𝑡 =1 if HH expects a loss of employment income in next 4 weeks 
due to pandemic  
Binary 
Household size 𝑋𝑖𝑠𝑡 Number of persons in HH Continuous 
Female 𝑋𝑖𝑠𝑡 = 1 if HH head is Female Binary 
Married  𝑋𝑖𝑠𝑡 =1 if HH head is married Binary 
Age 𝑋𝑖𝑠𝑡 HH head age in 2020, calculated as 2020 – birth year Continuous 
Ethnicity  𝑋𝑖𝑠𝑡 HH head ethnicity  
= 1 if non-Hispanic White 
= 2 if non-Hispanic Black 
= 3 if non-Hispanic Asian 
= 4 if non-Hispanic other or mixed 




𝑋𝑖𝑠𝑡 HH head educational attainment 
= 1 if less than high school degree 
= 2 if high school or equivalent degree 
= 3 if bachelor’s degree 
= 4 if graduate degree 
Categorical 
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Income Category 𝑋𝑖𝑠𝑡 HH pre-tax 2019 income categorized into eight groups, with one 
group for missing data  
Categorical 
Credit and debit 
card spending 







𝑋𝑖𝑠𝑡 Log of average number of people hospitalized with COVID-19 per 
100,000 in past week 
Source: COVID Tracker  
Continuous 
Initial regular UI 
claim rate 




eligibility UI claim 
rate 





𝑈𝐼 Time-varying statutory maximum UI benefit amount 
Source: Government websites 
Continuous 
Spending – UI  𝑈𝐼 = 1 if HH used UI benefits for spending needs in past week Binary 
Spending – 
Regular income 
 =1 if HH used regular income sources like those used before the 




 =1 if HH reports loss of employment income since March 13, 2020 Binary 




























Appendix Table A2: Summary Statistics 
Variables Food sufficient Food insufficient All 
Employment status    
Had work in past week 0.678 0.432 0.648 
 (0.001) (0.004) (0.001) 
Not working, pandemic reasons 0.130 0.303 0.152 
 (0.001) (0.004) (0.001) 
     Not working, other reasons 0.192 0.265 0.201 
 (0.001) (0.003) (0.001) 
Household expects income loss in next 
month 0.303 0.625 0.343 
 (0.001) (0.004) (0.001) 
Household pre-pandemic food insufficiency     
     Enough of kinds of food wanted  0.735 0.217 0.671 
 (0.001) (0.003) (0.001) 
     Enough, but not always kind of food 
wanted 0.239 0.152 0.228 
 (0.001) (0.003) (0.001) 
     Sometimes not enough to eat 0.023 0.480 0.080 
 (0.000) (0.004) (0.001) 
     Often not enough to eat 0.002 0.151 0.021 
 (0.000) (0.003) (0.000) 
Household size 3.512 3.958 3.567 
 (0.005) (0.017) (0.005) 
Female 0.507 0.543 0.512 
 (0.001) (0.004) (0.001) 
Age 42.822 40.211 42.500 
 (0.034) (0.099) (0.032) 
Race/ethnicity    
White, non-Hispanic 0.626 0.434 0.603 
 (0.001) (0.004) (0.001) 
Black, non-Hispanic 0.108 0.218 0.121 
 (0.001) (0.003) (0.001) 
Asian, non-Hispanic 0.058 0.029 0.054 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Mixed race or other, non-Hispanic 0.039 0.056 0.041 
 (0.000) (0.002) (0.000) 
Hispanic of any race 0.169 0.263 0.181 
 (0.001) (0.004) (0.001) 
Married 0.563 0.357 0.537 
 (0.001) (0.004) (0.001) 
Level of Education    
Less than high school 0.067 0.182 0.081 
 (0.001) (0.004) (0.001) 
High school equivalent 0.585 0.722 0.602 
 (0.001) (0.004) (0.001) 
Bachelor’s degree 0.200 0.065 0.183 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Graduate degree 0.149 0.031 0.134 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
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Household 2019 income categories    
Less than $25,000 0.103 0.339 0.132 
 (0.001) (0.004) (0.001) 
$25,000 - $34,999 0.085 0.161 0.095 
 (0.001) (0.003) (0.001) 
$35,000 - $49,000 0.099 0.128 0.103 
 (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) 
$50,000 - $74,999 0.152 0.121 0.148 
 (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) 
$75,000 - $99,999 0.123 0.050 0.114 
 (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) 
$100,000 - $149,999 0.149 0.028 0.134 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
$150,000 - $199,999 0.070 0.007 0.062 
 (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) 
$200,000 and above 0.076 0.004 0.067 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Unknown prior income 0.142 0.161 0.145 
 (0.001) (0.003) (0.001) 
COVID-19 hospitalization rate 15.125 16.363 15.277 
 (0.027) (0.091) (0.026) 
Credit and debit card spending -0.086 -0.084 -0.086 
 (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) 
New UI claim rate 0.838 0.846 0.839 
 (0.001) (0.005) (0.001) 
Maximum unemployment insurance benefits 954.798 933.578 952.179 
 (0.434) (1.420) (0.419) 
    
Observations 1,234,436 103,535 1,337,971 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. Table reports the mean and standard errors for key independent variables in 

















Appendix Table A3: Unemployment Insurance by State  
State 
Base Weekly 
Maximum UI Extension Amount Estimated Date of First Payment 
Alabama $275 $300 9/3/20 
Alaska $370 $300 11/6/20 
Arizona $240 $300 8/24/20 
Arkansas $451 $300 9/12/20 
California $450 $300 10/22/20 
Colorado $618 $300 9/18/20 
Connecticut $649 $300 9/17/20 
Delaware $400 $300 9/20/20 
District of Columbia $444 $300 9/24/20 
Florida $275 $300 9/8/20 
Georgia $365 $300 9/11/20 
Hawaii $648 $300 9/25/20 
Idaho $448 $300 9/10/20 
Illinois $484 $300 9/9/20 
Indiana $390 $300 9/21/20 
Iowa $481 $300 9/9/20 
Kansas $488 $300 10/9/20 
Kentucky $552 $400 9/13/20 
Louisiana $247 $300 8/27/20 
Maine $445 $300 9/12/20 
Maryland $430 $300 9/12/20 
Massachusetts $823 $300 9/1/20 
Michigan $362 $300 9/18/20 
Minnesota $740 $300 9/4/20 
Mississippi $235 $300 9/27/20 
Missouri $320 $300 8/26/20 
Montana $552 $400 8/24/20 
Nebraska $440 $300 10/6/20 
Nevada $469 $300 10/15/20 
New Hampshire $427 $300 9/10/20 
New Jersey $713 $300 10/22/20 
New Mexico $511 $300 9/9/20 
New York $504 $300 9/17/20 
North Carolina $350 $300 9/3/20 
North Dakota $618 $300 9/16/20 
Ohio $647 $300 9/15/20 
Oklahoma $539 $300 9/23/20 
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Oregon $648 $300 10/1/20 
Pennsylvania $572 $300 9/17/20 
Rhode Island $732 $300 9/3/20 
South Carolina $326 $300 9/24/20 
South Dakota $414 $0 N/A 
Tennessee $275 $300 8/27/20 
Texas $521 $300 8/24/20 
Utah $580 $300 9/11/20 
Vermont $513 $300 9/24/20 
Virginia $378 $300 10/16/20 
Washington $790 $300 9/22/20 
West Virginia $424 $400 9/16/20 
Wisconsin $370 $300 10/15/20 
Wyoming $508 $300 9/16/20 
Sources: Base UI gathered from government websites by the COVID-19 State Policy Database. Paydate estimates 
taken from the Lost Wages Assistance Tracker found at 
https://www.unemploymentpua.com/articles/lwatracker.html. Wisconsin, Nevada and Alaska were listed as 







Appendix Table A4: Association Between UI Generosity and Employment  
   
 (1) (2) 
Variables Not Working Work Loss 
   
Maximum 
Statutory UI 
(hundreds) -0.048*** 0.015 
 (0.015) (0.015) 
   
Observations 1,358,213 1,358,447 
Notes: Column 1 regressed on a binary variable for whether or not the household head had work in the past week. 
Column 2 regressed on a binary variable for whether or not the household experienced  a loss of employment 
income since March 13, 2020. Controls include expected loss of household income, prior food insufficiency, prior 
income category, household size, household head’s gender, age, ethnicity and marital status, and state-level credit 
and debit card spending. All estimations are weighted using sample survey weights, and all include state and week 








Appendix Table A5: Differences in Covariate Means Between Treated and Untreated 
Groups for the Full Sample, Before FPUC Expiration 
 Unadjusted Means Adjusted Means 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Variables Untreated Treated Difference  Untreated Treated Difference 
           
Household pre-pandemic food 
insufficiency        
     Enough of kinds of food wanted  0.672 0.601 0.071*** 0.659 0.663 0.004 
 (0.002) (0.006) (0.000) (0.002) (0.005) (0.808) 
     Enough, but not always kind of     
food wanted 0.231 0.291 0.060*** 0.239 0.246 0.007 
 (0.002) (0.006) (0.000) (0.002) (0.005) (0.127) 
Sometimes not enough to eat 0.079 0.091 0.012*** 0.083 0.074 0.009** 
 (0.002) (0.004) (0.001) (0.002) (0.003) (0.031) 
     Often not enough to eat 0.019 0.017 0.002 0.019 0.016 0.003 
 (0.001) (0.002) (0.438) (0.001) (0.002) (0.183) 
Household size 3.608 3.701 0.093*** 3.636 3.598 0.038 
 (0.010) (0.027) (0.001) (0.010) (0.025) (0.218) 
Female 0.508 0.518 0.010** 0.510 0.510 0.000 
 (0.002) (0.006) (0.020) (0.002) (0.006) (0.651) 
Age 42.371 41.223 1.148*** 42.171 42.601 0.430** 
 (0.068) (0.167) (0.000) (0.070) (0.153) (0.029) 
Race/ethnicity       
     White, non-Hispanic 0.600 0.540 0.060*** 0.588 0.604 0.016** 
 (0.002) (0.006) (0.000) (0.003) (0.006) (0.036) 
     Black, non-Hispanic 0.123 0.144 0.021*** 0.127 0.121 0.006 
 (0.002) (0.004) (0.000) (0.002) (0.003) (0.183) 
     Asian, non-Hispanic 0.051 0.069 0.018*** 0.052 0.059 0.007 
 (0.001) (0.004) (0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.131) 
     Mixed race or other, non- 
Hispanic 0.043 0.044 0.001 0.044 0.041 0.003 
 (0.001) (0.002) (0.613) (0.001) (0.002) (0.247) 
     Hispanic of any race 0.183 0.204 0.021*** 0.189 0.176 0.013* 
 (0.002) (0.006) (0.000) (0.002) (0.005) (0.056) 
Married 0.536 0.474 0.062*** 0.527 0.529 0.002 
 (0.002) (0.006) (0.000) (0.002) (0.006) (0.752) 
Level of Education       
     Less than high school 0.094 0.084 0.01 0.095 0.081 0.014*** 
 (0.002) (0.005) (0.140) (0.002) (0.004) (0.009) 
     High school equivalent 0.585 0.685 0.100*** 0.600 0.601 0.001 
 (0.002) (0.005) (0.000) (0.002) (0.006) (0.933) 
     Bachelor’s degree 0.178 0.160 0.018*** 0.174 0.180 0.006 
 (0.001) (0.003) (0.000) (0.001) (0.004) (0.193) 
     Graduate degree 0.143 0.071 0.072*** 0.131 0.138 0.007 
 (0.001) (0.002) (0.000) (0.001) (0.004) (0.121) 
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Household 2019 income categories       
     Less than $25,000 0.150 0.174 0.024*** 0.157 0.133 0.024*** 
 (0.002) (0.005) (0.000) (0.002) (0.004) (0.000) 
     $25,000 - $34,999 0.099 0.135 0.036*** 0.107 0.096 0.011*** 
 (0.002) (0.004) (0.000) (0.002) (0.003) (0.005) 
     $35,000 - $49,000 0.105 0.135 0.030*** 0.110 0.107 0.003 
 (0.001) (0.004) (0.000) (0.002) (0.003) (0.498) 
     $50,000 - $74,999 0.146 0.182 0.036*** 0.149 0.162 0.013** 
 (0.002) (0.005) (0.000) (0.002) (0.004) (0.018) 
     $75,000 - $99,999 0.113 0.117 0.004 0.112 0.123 0.011*** 
 (0.001) (0.004) (0.406) (0.001) (0.004) (0.008) 
     $100,000 - $149,999 0.135 0.102 0.033*** 0.130 0.135 0.005 
 (0.001) (0.003) (0.000) (0.001) (0.004) (0.167) 
     $150,000 - $199,999 0.063 0.035 0.028*** 0.058 0.059 0.001 
 (0.001) (0.002) (0.000) (0.001) (0.003) (0.695) 
     $200,000 and above 0.071 0.022 0.049*** 0.064 0.064 0.000 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.004) (0.856) 
     Unknown prior income 0.119 0.099 0.020*** 0.115 0.121 0.006 
 (0.001) (0.004) (0.000) (0.001) (0.004) (0.104) 
 
      
Observations 356,999 48,836  356,999 48,836  
Notes: Unadjusted means are weighted by survey sample weights. Adjusted means are weighted by inverse-
propensity and survey sample weights. Standard errors for the means in parentheses for columns 1, 2, 4 and 5. P-





























Appendix Table A6. Difference-in-Differences Estimate of Change in Spending on Groceries 
and Prepared Meals for UI Beneficiaries After FPUC Expiration 
 
  (1) (2) (3) 
Variables Full Sample Not Working Non-Regular Income  
Panel 1 – Grocery Spending 
    
Treated 0.063*** 0.113*** 0.154*** 
 (0.012) (0.020) (0.021) 
(Treated) * (Post-FPUC) -0.065*** -0.051** -0.089*** 
 (0.014) (0.023) (0.025) 
    
F-statistic 0.859 0.973 0.889 
Observations 870,226 244,037 202,644 
R-squared 0.053 0.053 0.050 
Panel 2 – Prepared Meal Spending  
    
Treated 0.025 0.074** 0.169*** 
 (0.021) (0.033) (0.033) 
(Treated) * (Post-FPUC) -0.115*** -0.153*** -0.185*** 
 (0.024) (0.040) (0.041) 
    
F-statistic 0.564 0.824 0.810 
Observations 862,896 241,510 200,071 
R-squared 0.064 0.046 0.064 
Notes: Results are from linear regression estimations of equation (3).  The dependent variable for Panel 1 is the log 
of adult-equivalency-adjusted weekly household spending on groceries, and the dependent variable for Panel 2 is the 
adjusted spending on prepared meals. Both panels include all post-FPUC observations. Column 1 includes the full 
sample for which we have information about UI use, while column 2 restricts the sample to household heads that did 
not work in the past week, and column 3  restricts the sample to households that did not use regular, pre-pandemic 
income sources for spending needs in the past week. Post-FPUC effects are captured by week fixed effects and 
therefore omitted. Controls include expected loss of household income, prior food insufficiency, prior income 
category, household size, household head’s job status, gender, age, ethnicity and marital status, and state-level credit 
and debit card spending. All estimations are weighted using inverse-propensity and sample survey weights, and all 
include state and week fixed effects. Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * 
p<0.1 
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Appendix Figure A1: Food Insufficiency by Demographics 
 






Appendix Figure A2: Food Spending by Employment 
 
Notes: Values are weighted using survey sample weights. Week 54 indicates the second week of 2021.  
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Appendix Figure A3: Food CPI by Division 
 
Notes: Food CPI in urban areas, June 2019=1. Source is Bureau of Labor Statistics. Month 13 indicates 



























Notes: Estimated margins of each week on food insufficiency from linear regression of equation (4). Estimates use 
the full post-FPUC observation period. Controls include employment status, expected loss of household income, prior 
food insufficiency, prior income category, household size, household head’s job status, age, gender, ethnicity and 
marital status, and state-level COVID-19 hospitalization rate, initial UI claim rate and credit and debit card spending. 
Week and state fixed effects included. Estimates presented with 95% confidence intervals. All estimates weighted 
using inverse propensity weights. 
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Notes: Estimated margins of each week on food insufficiency from linear regression of equation (4). Estimates use 
the full post-FPUC observation period. Controls include employment status, expected loss of household income, 
prior food insufficiency, prior income category, household size, household head’s job status, age, gender, ethnicity 
and marital status, and state-level COVID-19 hospitalization rate, initial UI claim rate and credit and debit card 
spending. Week and state fixed effects included. Estimates presented with 95% confidence intervals. All estimates 
weighted using inverse propensity weights. 
 
